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Is R.S. Peters’ way of mentioning women in his texts detrimental to 
Philosophy of Education? Some considerations and questions. 
Abstract 
Discussion in this article considers the unfortunate way R.S. Peters made mention of 
women when it was pertinent to his argumentation: portraying them, directly or 
indirectly, as abuse-able (murderable), deficient, aberrant, clueless and inconstant. It is 
argued that the high profile and esteem within which R.S. Peter’s texts are held within 
philosophy of education might be a problem for it as a scholarly mixed gender 
community. Three issues are considered in relation to current possible bias caused by 
R. S. Peters’ presentation of women in his texts: implicit (unconscious) bias against 
female philosophers of education; a connection between denigration of women’s value 
by Peters and current low status and marginalisation for alternative (progressive) 
educational ideas; and the extent to which these matters could be invidiously affecting 
the development of philosophy of education as scholarship and community. 
Keywords: R.S. Peters; philosophy of education; implicit bias; feminist epistemology; 
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Article text 
 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on selections from the writings of R.S. Peters and suggests that his work 
includes aspects of linguistic sexism which are of the time when Peters wrote but which have 
the potential to do damage now in the 21
st
 century - also before and beyond - to our 
understanding of education and educational philosophy. That he was ‘very much a man of his 
time’ (Barrow 2010, 9) is in some regards an active issue for philosophy of education now. 
Whilst the ‘general’ sexism in Peters’ writings has already, naturally, been noticed and 
commented upon (e.g. Phelan and Garrison 1994), a brief collection of some of the actually 
rather shocking specific instances of his mention of women in his writing has not been 
published with commentary.  
The paper considers three connected aspects. Firstly, it suggests that the manner in 
which Peters mentioned women, as examples, in his argumentation could be a current 
problem for philosophy of education as a community.  A problem would occur, I suggest, 
largely on account of implicit sexism bias. Such a form of bias can be held by both men and 
women and is subconscious. It is an unspoken and even unrecognised assumption that women 
are lesser, compared to men. I indicate below that valuing the voice of Peters – in line with 
the esteem he is held in – may imply agreeing implicitly with his presentation of women as 
inferior, unless strong and deliberate counter claims are made within the community of 
educational philosophers. Actively disowning this aspect of his work is needful, for 
otherwise, a silence is in place that can (more significantly) allow subtle and subconscious 
bias to have invidious and unintentional effects for women as philosophers of education. I do 
not claim implicit bias is the current case, but I raise the issue for consideration in light of 
some work done on the issue as acting against women as philosophers, in philosophy as 
singular discipline. 
Secondly, how Peters portrays what could nowadays be called ‘educational 
alternative’ stances of the progressive ‘child-centered’ variety (for what I mean for 
‘progressive’ these days, see e.g. Fielding 2010; Thomas and Pattison 2012), is discussed to 
highlight the modern denigration of such approaches as linked to Peters’ presentation of 
women. By clearly linking women to educational progressive (nowadays, also ‘alternative’) 
approaches, the question is asked whether Peters has contributed to creating a situation within 
philosophy of education where Peters’ educational un-mattering of women stops validity 
being given to this form of education, as connected. 
Thirdly, I make some brief comments about the implications of the above two 
possible bias issues for flourishing deep seated diversity of epistemological, as well as female 
gendered, activity. How does a modern field of educational philosophy, formed and 
functioning from within a community of philosophy of education that Peters helped 
significantly to found and whose philosophical constructs and conceptual legacies it has 
inherited, consider and question the issue of his presentation of women and his connections 
of women to a certain kind of education?  
For my argument to hold it relies on what exactly Peters says about women in his 
writings. My comments relevant to today are based on this language and the fact of this in our 
modern community. It is suggested this language of Peters has a power that is an influence 
still, in ways which can be fruitfully and helpfully brought into conscientization.  
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R.S. Peters and women: What does he say about them? 
Naturally when one reads Peter’s writing, allowances are made that the period of the 60s and 
70s in which he wrote some of his key texts was still to see social forms of gender equalising 
such as law attempting to generate equal pay. That social period was still to better appreciate 
that women might have more to their capacities than being a supportive ‘loving wife’ (R. S. 
Peters 1967, 1) to a man. Crucially the form that writing took back then did not require 
acknowledgement of both genders. It almost exclusively addressed itself to men and spoke 
about men or boys when speaking about ‘people’. For instance:  
We talk about a person being trained as a philosopher, scientist, or cook, when we wish 
to draw attention to his acquired competence in a specific discipline of thought or art 
which has its intrinsic standards; we do not use the phrase ‘education as a philosopher, 
scientist, or cook’. We can, however, ask the further question whether such people are 
educated men. (R. S. Peters 2007, 61, emphasis in the original) 
But, there is something about the way in which Peters spoke about men as people that 
excludes women. For instance: 
In a teaching situation love must be a type that is appropriate to the special type of 
relationship in which the teacher is placed, to his concept of them as pupils rather than as 
sons or brothers. (Peters 2007, 64).   
Women do not seem to exist in an educational universe of Peters’ imagination. For a 
philosopher – a supposed thinker – who existed in a world where approximately half (and 
possibly more due to the second world war) of his local community of acquaintances were 
women, and who was personally in relationships with women, Peters does however not 
acknowledge women and females in general in his writings as existing with any authenticated 
presence, autonomy or educational voice. Even when he mentions in his argumentation  a 
‘woman’s equality issue’ such as a fair wage and voting rights he manages to miss the larger 
point of female suffering in favour of an analytical approach and write with a surprising level 
of emotional and social ‘distance’ from what the issue of voting and wage inequality actively 
signifies for those affected (R. S. Peters 1966a). He writes in a way that Jane Roland Martin 
calls ‘an ivory tower person’ (1981, 104) certainly. But furthermore, lest we forget, he 
actively objectifies women in his writing as the following quote from this same essay on 
equality would suggest: ‘Similarly whether a man fixes his eye on one girl in the street rather 
than another is not a matter of justice, whatever its status in the sphere of manners.’ (op.cit. 
124). 
Two further examples from his writing show this tendency to portray women and the female 
as present for the decisions and existence of a man and their invisibility when it comes to 
educational matters:  
Even Hobbes, thought to be one of the precursors of modern totalitarianism, presumed 
that the sovereign would not interfere with matters such as the subject’s choice of 
vocation, choice of wife, and choice of education for his children. (R. S. Peters 1966b, 
205)  
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 In deciding, for instance, whether to inflict corporal punishment on a pupil, one 
difference in the situation might be that this boy is the son of a political enemy. (R. S. 
Peters 1966a, 122) 
This is a distortion of an educational truth, even for his time. Women were very much 
connected to their children’s education as home-makers and mothers.  Naturally, girls 
abounded in schools. In terms of educational decision making and power, looking after the 
course of a child’s education, was, in the period of the 60s from whence these extracts come, 
not just a man’s domain at all and possibly quite the opposite. I remember my grandparents, 
whose children were schooled in the 50s and 60s, disclosing to me that one division of labour 
in the marriage was the understanding that my grandmother – an ‘educated’ woman - was to 
be in charge of the children’s education. Furthermore, to focus on the second quote just 
given, a political enemy might have a daughter who needs a thrashing; a girl might be a 
school pupil. But that does not seem to be possible in Peter’s imagination or indeed within a 
concept of a school, as portrayed in this instance. It sounds rather like the school in which 
pupils reside are, by default, single sex establishments for boys. In 1966, this was not 
educational reality. The action and effect is to deny the (valid) existence of females, through 
writing. They are written out. This is a pernicious silencing of denial (see Zerubavel 2006). It 
also raises questions, I believe, about Peters’ status as an educationist. Different people will 
see that in different ways of course and make different levels of consideration of the time in 
which Peters wrote as a justification or such a stance in his writings. Perhaps at the time of 
Peters’ writing of these texts it was less of a question mark over his educationist status, even 
through the eyes of women, given what was culturally expected and accepted then. Today, 
however, in the light of improved gender equality and less denial and silence around the role 
of women in society as educational players and decision makers, I suggest it marks him – for 
us - as deficient. 
The way in which Peters does mention women adds to the impression of them as 
being silenced. They are portrayed as deserving low status, existing with a lack of autonomy 
and there is a disinterest in recognising their existence as a part of a written educational 
discussion. Even for his time the extent to which this occurs is striking. If we compare this 
approach to women to another writer of his period, Thomas S. Kuhn, we see in Kuhn’s 
writings a linguistic disregard for women but no stand-out mentions of them (Kuhn 1962). 
Erich Fromm, as another writer of Peter’s generation, is also ‘of his time’ in the way he 
writes without gender neutrality (Fromm 1956) but he does not offend a modern woman’s 
sensibilities with his old fashioned ways. Peter’s mentions of women stand out.  
This happens in modern times with perhaps some level of pain for women reading his 
texts now. It would be interesting in the future to conduct a survey of women in the field of 
philosophy of education to gauge their responses to Peters and his mentions of women. For 
present purposes of conscientization with a view to such possible wider action, I can offer a 
personal account of one woman (new) in the field:  I myself do not want, when encountering 
a canonical writer in the academic field of my activity, to have to wade through Peters’ 
mentions of women. They actively offend me and, in fact, without fail. Each time he 
mentions women I find it humiliating and I am yet to read a mention he makes of women in 
his texts which is not distasteful to my modern understanding of myself and my fellow 
women. I am also left with a distasteful sense that the men and women who are my 
colleagues now, do not challenge this when Peters is used and is esteemed. I have found it 
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strange that I have never, before offering this article, openly heard disapproving mention of 
this tendency of Peters’ in discussion. I assumed it was a widely understood matter that Peters 
is a problem is this regard, and yet in the development of this article I have received some 
(encouraging) comments from reviewers who both recognise the silence and indicate they 
believe it is time this issue emerged from the shadows. This is also not just an issue dealing 
with the past. When I discovered in the last year a recent reprinting of Peters work involving 
negative mentions of woman, without editing or prefacing about this (i.e. Peters 2007) it 
affected me such that I felt betrayed by modern scholarship standards that his gender 
blindness and strange or clichéd sexist comments about females are not dealt with. I doubt I 
am the only woman to feel this way. 
Different people will have different levels of sensitivity to this matter. Is it really so 
bad? Am I being oversensitive? Let us then consider a few more examples and the issue can 
be an open question. When Peters mentions women they are in the following kind of 
positions: a girl is from a remand home, a mother is insufficient, a female teacher has only an 
unevidenced hunch for her views (see R. S. Peters 1959, 56, 116, 130). Girls have no taste or 
common-sense: ‘girls [who] develop outwards from this solid centre’ of liking boys for the 
right reasons not the wrong ones (Peters 2007, 66). Women are amongst the mad and Nazis: 
‘It is no use employing logical arguments with a maniac, a hysterical woman, or an enraged 
Nazi.’ (Peters 1966a, 125).   
When it comes to his discussion of women’s rights, Peters offers the following 
criticisms on behalf of women: 
In the case of voting, for instance, anyone who is prepared to argue the case will never 
base his proposal purely on the fact that women are women. There are, of course, those 
who have a completely irrational attitude. For them women may simply be classed as 
inferior beings. But argument is pointless with such people... (Peters 1966a, 127). 
That might be viewed as Peters sticking up for women. Peters goes on shortly after to suggest 
other considerations concerning women’s rights: 
If however, a person is really prepared to argue he will produce reasons related to 
principles such as those of the consideration of people’s interests or respect for persons. 
He will connect ‘being a woman’ with other properties such as being ignorant of public 
affairs, or being influenced too much by emotion or by the opinion of her husband, which 
are relevant to what he considers to be the point of the activity. He may also point out 
that children and imbeciles are not permitted to vote. Presumably this is because it is 
thought that matters of private and public interest are not well promoted by the votes of 
those who lack a knowledge of public affairs. Or it may be thought that they are not fully 
‘persons’. Are women, therefore, in these respects, which are accepted as relevant, 
different from men? But supposing women are ignorant. Supposing it is argued that the 
illiterate should be excluded from voting as well as women for more or less the same 
reasons. The issue is not yet settled. For what of their dignity as persons? Should not 
their point of view be taken into account of even though it is not a well-informed one? 
And how is their point of view to be taken into account of if they have no opportunity of 
expressing it? (Peters 1966a, 127-128) 
I suggest that even if this is the way that argument takes its structure, is the end effect to 
portray women as questionably informed, questionably eloquent, questionably rational? Is it 
innocent discussion or is there something there that could offend a woman reading this ‘use’ 
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of women to prove a male philosopher’s point? Ought we to wonder about it?  
Another strange inclusion of mention of women - in a ‘helpful’ context of their 
domination by men: ‘The ‘mixed-up kid’ who says that he cannot help trying to strangle his 
girl-friend is committing a logical absurdity...’ (Peters 1959, 60). I offer to this present 
exercise in consideration a final example:  
When Pope said that women have no characters at all he was not, surely, suggesting that 
they were dishonest, selfish, and mendacious. Presumably he was suggesting that they 
were fickle, inconstant, and sporadic in conforming to standards because they were at the 
mercy of their moods and inclinations. Or he might have been suggesting that they took 
their standards entirely from their husbands or from the clique in which they happened to 
collect. (Peters 1959, 113)  
What Affects from Peters on the Status of Women in Philosophy of Education 
Today? 
Although scholars may have some reservations with regard to educational arguments, Peters 
is esteemed in the community of philosophy of education (eg Cuypers and Martin 2011; Hirst 
1986a). The event of Peters’ recent death in old age brought forth, naturally, further remarks 
about his position and contribution to philosophy of education, as currently experienced. For 
instance, this obituary comment by the London Institute of Education Director Chris 
Husbands: ‘His contribution to the philosophy of education cannot be overestimated, and 
many of his works on the aims of education still command a global readership almost fifty 
years after they were written’ (IoE 2012).  
Let us remember, as if it were significant for philosophy of education, that Peters is 
read around the world. This includes countries where serious and systemic neglect, abuse and 
inequality towards women takes place, such as Nigeria. I know that for a fact because a 
Google analytics style programme tells me really rather often (via on online profile page I 
have) that “R. S. Peters AND aims of education” (or a variant) searches, landing on my page, 
come from Nigeria and other countries where women are poorly protected from male abuses. 
It is not politically disputed that women in many countries, such as those that produce people 
searching for information on R.S. Peters via search engines, are viewed as less than men. 
This is still widely prevalent to the point of often being blatantly and unashamedly against a 
woman’s human rights. Wiley Blackwell, as publisher of the journal connected to the 
organisation (Philosophy of Education Society Great Britain) that Peters helped to found, 
offers access links on their website page for that journal to Afghanistan, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, India and many other places condemned for their violent and regular abuses of 
women. His books may have made their way to these countries.  
As a part of philosophy of education scholarship, to what extent does R. S. Peters’ 
written portrayal of women perpetuate social and personal difficulties for women in such 
countries, rather than offer other, happier, alternative perspectives as developed 
contemporaneously in some countries by feminism. When philosophy of education, as 
influenced by Peters, is put into play in these countries, what impact does it have on 
education as a mixed gendered activity? Given that we often deliberately denounce and 
exclude sexist writings in today’s journal submissions and outputs, can we control Peters, 
esteemed abroad - and esteem supported abroad by esteem closer to a more gender-equal 
home base - as not acting against our present wishes in this regard? Is he a good ambassador 
for philosophy of education supported for consumption abroad, without a robust stance that 
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can deal with this aspect of his presentation to the public in particular?  
 
Implicitness 
Given the above examples of writing from Peters portraying or hinting at women as deficient, 
does this esteem and influence underpin and support something in philosophy of education 
that feminist philosophers from philosophy as a singular discipline are beginning now to 
highlight as a serious issue for their field? Is esteeming R.S. Peters, in part, an academic’s 
problem? Work by Jenny Saul and Helen Beebee, heads of the philosophy department of the 
University of Sheffield and School of Philosophy, Theology & Religion at University of 
Birmingham respectively, offer a new perspective on matters to do with gender inequality in 
philosophy. They highlight the fact that women in philosophy constitute around only 20 
percent of posts, for instance (Beebee and Saul 2011). They further suggest that what goes on 
in philosophy is implicit bias, which is non-deliberate prejudice: 
Recent psychological research has shown that most people—even those who explicitly 
and sincerely avow egalitarian views—hold ‘implicit biases’ against such groups as 
blacks, women, gay people, and so on, based on unconscious stereotypes of these groups. 
(2011, 12) 
If R.S. Peters, with his stereotypically sexist portrayals (direct or indirect) of women as 
helpless, deficient and clueless is part of philosophy of education and philosopher women are 
showing by exposition from research that stereotypes cause unconscious sexism, what effect 
does R.S. Peters as esteemed and influential have on the thinking of people in philosophy of 
education about women as philosophers and equal colleagues in the academy? It is worth 
considering if the presence of such writing in the canon of philosophy of education adds to 
what is clearly a powerful social issue such that ‘Even...  members of the ‘targeted’ group are 
susceptible to implicit bias...’ (ref. citation above). One could conclude, at best, Peters in the 
canon does not help equality of perception of women as equally as competent as men. I think 
it is fair to suggest that Peters going unquestioned and there being a continuing silence about 
this matter of his writing-comments on women aids a situation where a woman as an 
excellent and valid philosopher of education is somehow slightly deviant. She is not esteemed 
as an equal in any respect to the male philosopher of education. Beebee discusses women in 
philosophy as being seen as ‘atypical’ and ‘therefore counted as deviant in some way’ 
(Beebee forthcoming). Such a situation means that male philosophers are normative for the 
discipline as what a philosopher is, and women are required to conform: to be a male 
philosopher in order to be a proper philosopher; to speak and think according to a 
phallogocentrism  that defines women by what they lack, not what they offer. This is of 
course something which many philosophers, both male and female, have pointed to critically 
in their commentaries of thinking (eg Derrida 2004; Irigaray 1985). Perhaps it is good and 
scholarly for philosophy of education to consider to what extent phallogocentricism is 
stubbornly occurring in its own arena because of the influence of R.S. Peters. 
Women as Silly Educationists and R.S. Peters 
As the previous section showed, Peters wrote in an unfortunate way when the subject (in both 
senses of the term, as topic and as object) of women came into his writing. What I have not 
yet highlighted is that this denigration was extended to women’s educational activity. 
Education as activity has developed since the start of compulsory schooling in the late 19
th
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century with a patriarchal and masculine epistemology (Pendlebury 2005). The very recent 
challenge to this epistemology by feminist philosophers of education seeking to widen the 
framework of available perspectives about what constitutes valid education is an important 
advance. Work on care and the home by philosophers such as Nel Noddings and Jane Roland 
Martin shows how significantly feminist forms of knowing have been ignored and kept 
invisible (Noddings 1984; Jane Roland Martin 2011). Women and their thoughts about 
education have been missing (Jane  Roland Martin 2003). 
With recent initiatives from the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 
having funded gatherings of female (and male) philosophers (in particular early career 
philosophers of education) offering support to development of female networking, women are 
finding new levels of voice in the scholarly community.  My presentation here then is perhaps 
foremost to highlight a legacy of writing, thinking and no doubt networking, that was in the 
past without an awareness of gender as a vibrant part of what philosophy of education is and 
can be in a positive manner. It is also to present a problematisation of a legacy that does not 
offer such positivity for the actualisation of a newly thriving gender equality in philosophy of 
education, if such potential is troubled by an unqualified regard for a key community figure 
in relation to this ‘woman’ issue. Clearly, without specific problematisation in this ‘woman’ 
respect regard for R.S. Peters is then wrongly construed and perpetuated. Problems with him 
are not just about his educational arguments. 
A few gatherings of women networking and discussing philosophy, of course, does not 
significantly impact instantly on the possibility that the legacy mentioned is soaked 
inexorably and deeply into the epistemological bones of philosophy of education. To dissolve 
a patriarchically and masculine soaked perspective will not happen overnight. We are, as Paul 
Standish says, in commenting on the passing of R.S. Peters, now at ‘the end of an era’ (IoE 
2012). To make a transfer to another situation, to another era, where women are not ‘deviant’ 
or ‘atypical’ as philosophers of education but are instead normal and the epistemology of 
education is deep-seatedly and authentically variant, not determinant, is a long term project. 
In being long term it addresses both the reality that modern philosophy of education is a 
community open to diverse perspectives (Chambliss 2009; Hayden 2012) and the aporias 
which allow that diversity to seem to answer the issues brought forward here, yet where the 
situation does not go far enough in recognising factors in the heritage of philosophy of 
education demanding closer scrutiny for deep seated diversity to flourish.  
What I now wish to focus on then - but briefly - for its links to the ‘woman issue’ 
discussed here, is that Peters did not like ‘progressive education’. It was too vague: ‘It cannot 
remain for long romantically aloft once the glare of philosophical analysis is turned upon it.’ 
(Peters 2007, 59). He furthermore linked it to women: ‘He, or more likely, she, tends to 
believe that education consists in the development from within of potentialities...’ (58). Peters 
criticises the progressive educational foci of ‘ “growth” and “self-realisation”, as caricatures 
of an educational situation’: he prefers ‘determinateness about standards’ (p59). There is a 
flaw in Peters’ reasoning here. He also admitted that ‘there are many issues... on which no 
work exists at all. What, for instance, is meant by “education”?’ (R.S. Peters 1973, 3). So, 
what is progressive education a caricature of, if we don’t know what is meant by education?  
What happens in this regard seems to be a dismissal of a certain form of ‘progressive’ 
education by virtue, I suggest, of its connection to the female. I will base my presentation not 
so much on what Peters says as argument against such education: that is the topic for an 
entire other paper. I will instead limit myself here to comments on his writing. Whenever 
Peters mentions this form of education, he has a habit of moving from use of the male 
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persona to signify a teacher or educationist, to that of a female persona. For instance, in the 
essay What is an Educational Process? (R. S. Peters 1967), Peters notably uses the word man 
again and again (and all personae in the writing are male), yet at page 16, where he begins to 
mention education that involves ‘spontaneous curiosity’ the writing takes a negative turn and 
comments such as ‘rather a lot of nonsense is talked in this context about children 
‘discovering’ things’ (p. 17). The teacher involved written about over the length of these two 
pages has become suddenly female. As indicated above, Peters saw those connected to 
progressivism as ‘more likely, she’ (Peters 2007, 58).  It is a connection that denigrates both I 
suggest, given that women are portrayed by him – as I suggest above - also as lesser; with 
progressivism as less valid than the kind of ‘liberal education’ Thiessen identifies is Peter’s 
real philosophical concern: ‘normative, cognitive and procedural criteria of education’ 
(Thiessen 1989, 1). Thus, ‘the undifferentiated concept of education which refers in a very 
general way to the bringing up or rearing of children’ (ibid) is women’s work and not of 
educational value (see Jane Roland Martin 1981), whilst a concept of education that is clearly 
philosophically analytically ‘manipulatable’ is important and a valid concept for tinkering 
with. Peters is behaving with regard to education as though that which is hegemonically in 
the realm of the feminine (during the time of his writing) is not education at all. Whilst this 
might be old news for philosophers of education today who have studied Peters’ approach, 
what I suggest it creates today is an underpinning for conversations about education that 
feeds concerns, priorities and delimits arenas of philosophical conversation about education 
which persist in devaluing and de-validating ‘women’s work’ or, in more modern terms, a 
certain type and kind of educational activity that Peters was perhaps right to connect to 
women. Women do ‘progressivist’ education, of its ‘child centred’ kind, well1 (Jane Roland 
Martin 2011). Peters’ connected denigration of both is a phallic fallacy ripe for investigation 
of its rationale. I consider that looking at how he portrays women in his writing offers such 
investigation materials. 
 
It is well known that Peters was instrumental in developing philosophy of education 
as a discipline and used analytical rigour as a style to develop and underpin much needed 
validity: ‘there can be little doubt that the new order took any reputable educational 
philosophy to be continuous with a particular tradition of Anglo-American logical or 
conceptual analysis’ (Carr 1998, 181). What we ‘know’ is that the reason of such thought is 
dominantly male, not female (Lloyd 1984). So, not only can we make links at the surface of 
Peters writing and question  those links for their pernicious effects on value and validity of 
different forms and concepts of education but we can dig deeper. Does R.S. Peters conflating 
women and a certain style of education, compounded by his influence, turn that style of 
education into a style that is less valid than educational thought able to withstand ‘the glare of 
philosophical analysis’ (see above) – that type of analysis clearly being analytical? Is the fact 
that educational alternatives, including progressivist ideas (but not determined by them) are 
marginal and marginalised in Great Britain now (Conroy 2010; Lees 2011), part of a picture 
where education is historically not linked to women, not developed by women and women 
are devalued in the face of deciding what counts educationally? Indeed, if such education 
does not have at present as vital and vibrant a role in philosophy of education than it could I 
suggest it might be because of R.S. Peters and his formative influence on the field . 
                                                          
1
 Which is not to say that men do not also do it well, of course. 
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More Than One 
Clearly Peters is not the only figure in such a situation as just described. There are many 
factors of which he might be one. But what is clear is that his writing about women in his 
educational philosophy creates effects. My own distaste at reading his remarks is an example. 
Other, more substantive links, have been hinted at in this presentation but they suggest that 
further in-depth work, outside the current scope of this consciousness raising article, is 
needed. A final question here I would like to raise is why this presentation of women is so 
little remarked upon?  Since my own first exposure to what seems to me personally to be a 
wonderful community of philosophers of education who seem to actively strive to include 
women, despite a poor record of this elsewhere in  higher education philosophy, why a 
silence about Peters’ language about women? Are we just too busy to bother to notice and 
create conversations about it when there are so many other, nicer things to talk about? Is not 
noticing and not mentioning a question of overlooking a small detail about Peters? Or, is it a 
factor in more substantial concerns and questions to do with modern philosophy of education 
as significantly founded by Peters? 
Outing Peters then (further) as an influential sexist writer who may be contributing to 
inevitable implicit bias and other worries such as stereotype threat (under-performance 
because it is expected of a woman – see Beebee and Saul 2011; Saul forthcoming) is to 
problematise adulation of his contribution to what philosophy of education has become. 
Women are not missing (so much) these days. Yet perhaps silences need to be broken before 
we can consciously realise that some things are missing, are silences and are important 
contributions – such as due regard and wide ranging discussions for ‘otherwise’ educational 
alternatives philosophical approaches and perceptions of women philosophers of education as 
natural and normal, not bucking a back-story. These are contributions that can only emerge if 
we submit ourselves to conscientization; if we question the role and influence of this ‘great 
founding father’ (see Cuypers and Martin 2010, p.3); if we look at the generation of effects 
for philosophy of education that do not found but determine, at cost to women and 
educational difference, because of links to women and negative portrayals. These are 
contributions of critique furthermore that no longer suffer a rationale to support their 
exclusion through silence, as acted out by an ‘acceptable’ former time’s less equal social (and 
personal) attitude in philosophy of education. 
 
Redrawing the map? 
Conceptual mapping – which is something Peters found very important (Hirst 1986b) -  is 
fine and good but concepts are not for human manipulation without attending to their ‘reality’ 
as Megan Laverty argues, for they have ‘to use Stephen Mulhall’s phrase, “genuine 
substance”... They are not mere epiphenomena’ (Laverty 2010, 34, emphasis in original). In 
other words, ‘It is within the complex interplay of meaning and life that concepts come to be 
understood in greater depth. Conceptual understanding is progressive.’ (op cit, 36). This 
‘interplay’ includes women. I suggest therefore that the writings of Peters, in the ways that 
they conceptually exclude women and denigrate women as thinkers, damage philosophy of 
education.  The truth of educational thought is significantly underplayed in terms of 
complexity in Peters. 
Sadly, Peters was good at dismissing women as being involved in education. Katz 
notices, ‘his casual dismissal of child-rearing’ (Katz 2010, 101). Haydon acknowledges his 
lack of appreciation that ‘study and reflection on the moral development of girls and women 
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could bring a distinctive perspective to the field, and that Peter’s language is unremittingly 
not gender-neutral’ (Haydon 2010, 184-5). It is this ease of Peters’ as a philosopher in 
speaking educationally without women that I suggest is suspect: wrong, flawed and open to 
question. It also has affects as I have hinted at above that are about what we know about 
education. In this sense, Peters as a writer who writes badly of and about women is limiting 
educational understanding, not developing it. 
 
Conclusion 
Not everyone will agree with my presentation and the implications it bears for what we do 
and how we do it in philosophy of education. Perhaps it is in modern differences of response 
to the issues being pointed to that any debate for a 21
st
 century philosophy of education 
community, about Peters as an educationist ‘for all’, is located. I think that there will be clear 
differences of opinion: between those who consider there is something to the idea that Peters 
is, in this respect of his writing about women, a troublesome figure for the community, and 
those who think that this ‘heritage’ from Peters does not matter today. More than in any 
denigration of Peters himself, it is in the debate caused about our modern differences of 
opinion about this, that I see that the interest and potential for scholarly development is 
located. The value to be had now is in consideration of what the field is and might be for 
women especially, given likely differences from various quarters in reaction to the 
presentation here.  
To give him his due: R.S. Peters was an ardent academic worker and without his 
personal contribution philosophy of education would likely be less than it is today. He was a 
pioneer of philosophy of education. Busy people miss things inevitably. But to miss the 
importance of half the human race? What kind of educational thought is that? What kind of 
educational philosophy has it founded? What kind of community did it begin? I simply 
suggest this is worth thinking about some more, because, whether male or female, we care 
about what we do. 
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